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Abstract 
During the last decades, Central banks have been preoccupied to address financial market stability by complementing the 
traditional microprudential policies with a macroprudential approach that allows a holistic diagnosis and treatment of 
systemic vulnerabilities by deploying specific instruments meant to counter financial risks. The paper discusses the 
effectiveness of the monetary macroprudential policy pursued by The Romanian Central Bank to ensure financial stability 
under the threat of contagion induced by the global financial crises. The paper concludes that timely, countercyclical 
macroprudential policy measures are able to maintain the balance between stability and efficiency of the financial market as 
prerequisites of economic growth. 
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1. Macroprudential policy. Concept and tools 
 
The concept of macroprudential policy has been discussed at length during the last decade, academics and 
practitioners trying to raise awareness of the importance of financial stability as a prerequisite of economic 
development. Though no consensus concerning the definition was reached, opinions tend to converge towards 
maintaining the robustness of the financial system (Allen and Wood, 2006; Padoa-Schioppa, 2003). In addition, 
Schinasi (2004) stresses the resilience of the financial system to endogenous shocks while Brunnermeier et al. 
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(2009) argue the necessity to limit the systemic risks and their costs. Clement (2010) concluded that since its 
origins, macroprudential policies have always shown concern for the financial system’s stability and its link 
with the macroeconomy, the concept being employed at great length by academics and practitioners, as well, in 
the current financial crisis (Galati, Moessner, 2011). Generally, macroprudential policy addresses the financial 
system and its interconnectedness with the real economy. It focuses on preventing systemic risks, thereby 
reducing the probability of systemic events relating to financial institutions, markets, infrastructure and 
instruments that can threaten the system’s financial stability. 
 Nevertheless, the macroprudential approach came as a response to the limitations of microprudential 
policies that proved to be insufficient in dealing with financial vulnerability and contagion. (Borio, 2003) 
argues that, there are at least three reasons which should strengthen further the macroprudential policy 
framework.  
• first, in some important respects, the macroprudential objective  actually subsumes the rationale for its 
microprudential counterpart, 
• second, as a result of a better balance between market and institutional discipline, strengthening the 
macroprudential orientation holds out the promise of  better economic  performance, 
• third, and more subtly, given the nature of financial instability, a strict microprudential approach is 
less likely to deliver a safe and sound financial system. 
Therefore, a broader, holistic view was needed to safeguard financial stability. Consequently, 
macroprudential policies provide a set of widely accepted tools that may induce the same stabilising effects 
irrespective of the state of the economy were they are applied: policy rates, capital adequacy, liquidity ratio as 
well as nonconventional tools etc. (Bernancke and Reinhart, 2004). 
Schoenmaker (2010) discusses the importance of monetary, macroprudential and microprudential policies, 
showing that each one may pursue its own objectives without undermining the others. Panetta (2013) argues 
that microprudential supervision is a necessary precondition for effective macroprudential policy. Nevertheless, 
the monetary and macroprudential policies have the deepest effects on financial and economic stability. 
Given the unprecedented effects of the present crisis, the international financial institutions have take stock 
and became preoccupied to set up policies and recommendations concerning the implementation of 
macroprudential policies. 
The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), for example, is responsible for the macroprudential supervision 
of the EU financial system. In order to fulfil its tasks, the ESRB has identified four intermediate objectives and 
instruments to safeguard the banking system stability. (Fig 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1  
Adapted from ESRB, Flagship Report on Macroprudential Policy in The Banking Sector, 2014, pag  7-8 
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The ESRB Handbook “Operationalising Macroprudential Policy in the Banking Sector” (2014) suggests 
four stages to set up a macroprudential policy strategy: 
1. The identification and evaluation of risks based on reliable statistical data since the macroprudential 
policies may produce cross border effects and thus requiring the cooperation among national 
authorities; 
2. The selection and calibration of instruments to reflect the level of systemic risk; 
3. Implementation and communication in order to harmonize the objectives of various instruments; 
4. The assessment of the effectiveness of each instrument.  
The European national banking systems had various approaches to solve the present crisis. As experience 
show, systems that have chosen a countercyclical approach have manages to avoid major defaults that would 
have endangered the stability of the entire financial and economic system.  
For the purpose of the paper, the experience on the National Bank of Romania (NBR) was chosen to 
emphasise the importance of countercyclical measures in maintaining financial stability and in restoring the 
macroeconomic equilibrium.  
 
2. The approach of The National Bank of Romania as supervising  authority 
 
 In Romania, two financial authorities share the responsibility to ensure the financial stability: the regulation 
and prudential supervision of the credit institutions is entrusted to the National Bank of Romania (NBR), while 
the Authority for Financial Supervision (AFS) regards the insurance, capital and private pensions markets.  
To meet the EU requirements concerning the management of financial crisis, the Committee for Financial 
Stability was established in 2007 in order to prevent asses and manage the expected systemic risks. The 
committee reunites the Governor of the NBR, the President of the AFS, the Minister of Finance and the 
Manager of the Deposit Guarantee Fund. The committee acts as a transitory macroprudential authority until the 
macroprudential supervisory inter institutional structure becomes operational.  
The NBR has an intrinsic part in maintaining financial stability given its double position as monetary and 
supervising authority. Moreover, its institutional competences, the high share of bank assets within the 
financial system, liquidity supplier and lender of last resort support its role.   
The NBR is actively involved in the decision making process of the ESRB and of The Advisory Technical 
Committee (ATC). 
To fulfill its prudential policy mandate, The NBR initiates periodical assessments to identify the sources of 
systemic risks and their transmission channels. The monitoring of the financial system is a dynamic holistic 
process regarding the banking system, the financial markets as well as the macroeconomic and real economy 
developments. The main instruments to identify the potential risks are: stress testing, early warning, 
quantitative and qualitative analyses, econometric tests. 
The NBR publishes, on a yearly basis, the strength of the financial system (institutions, markets, 
infrastructure) emphasising the vulnerabilities that could affect the financial stability. The results of the 
analyses are used to fundament the monetary and prudential policies.  
Starting with 2008, The NBR has been increasingly concerned to develop the necessary tools and 
procedures for the financial crisis management. In order to assess the resilience of banking sector to shocks, 
stress tests are pursued for the credit, liquidity and solvency risks. 
The most recent stress test exercise for solvency that covers T3 2013 – T2 2015 shows a fairly good 
capacity to face significant adverse macroeconomic shocks as well as a capital adequacy above the NBR 
prudential requirements. An important actual test took place during the Cyprus crisis (March – April 2013) 
when the Bank of Cyprus transferred its deposits and assets to Marfin Bank. It was acknowledged that the 
communication strategy of the NBR was important in the transferring process by avoiding foreseeable panic 
episodes.(NBR Annual Report, 2013)  
Though considered as an outcome of the recent financial crisis, a number of macroprudential policy 
measures were applied in Romania and other emerging economies prior to the outbreak of the crisis. The 
rational of macroprudential measures were imposed by the threat of vulnerabilities in the banking system and 
the risk of contagion. 
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3. The macroprudential monetary policy tools 
Prior to the global financial crisis, the potential of the Romanian bank market was considerably high, 
marked by a growing activity and competitiveness. Specific for an open small economy, the increase of the 
interest rates to control inflationary shocks intensified the capital inflows inducing excessive financial risks. 
The macroprudential instruments used by the NBR, i.e. Loan to Value (LTV) and Debt to Income (DTI) 
reduced the burden of adverse shocks on the monetary policy, thus pursuing the price stability objective more 
effectively. Nevertheless, the financial stability became a constant preoccupation of The NBR that had to 
alleviate the shocks generated by the unanticipated variations of prices and capital inflows. 
The most significant vulnerability that has been identified in the financial stability reports was the increase 
of foreign exchange denominated loans granted during 2007-2008 to debtors that were not covered against 
foreign exchange risk. Consequently, a massive indebtedness of the population followed. 
The lending activity was influenced by the aggressive promotion of loans by the commercial banks as well 
as by the relaxed wages and fiscal policies that lead to an underestimation of risks by the banks and their 
debtors as well. In addition, the macroeconomic environment led to favourable conditions that intensified the 
lending process. 
The monetary policy interest rate was also associated with the share of the foreign exchange denominated 
loans that were perceived as cheaper (e.g. mortgage loans in Euros and Swiss francs) even by the debtors that 
were not secured against foreign exchange risks under a highly volatile inflation rate. 
The effects of the financial crisis started to show at the end of 2008 leading to a financial policy tightening. 
The Romanian banking system went from one extreme to another experiencing a deficit of liquidity in contrast 
to the excess of liquidity before the crisis, the lending activity slowed down, the bank asset portfolio 
deteriorated and indebtedness grew.  (Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). (NBR Financial Stability Report, 2013) 
The main determinants that have negatively impacted on the lending process were: the depreciation of the 
national currency following the capital outflow as a response to the liquidity problems on the international 
markets, the shrink of the GDP, the increase of the costs of lending, the predominance of risk aversion, 
negative economic perspectives, the drop of financial efficiency, unemployment, etc. 
       Other threats for the financial stability were: the tense international environment, the quality of banks’ 
balance sheet in the Euro zone, difficult access to funding, contagion, the debt crises, etc.  
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Real annual growth rate of loans to private sector  
Source: NBR 
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Fig 3 Non-performing loans at aggregate level 
Source: NBR 
 
 
      
      During to the crisis, the attitude of The NBR was to reinforce regulations and supervision, the banks being 
constrained to increase their capital and liquidity reserves, to provision bad loans, to maintain safe loan-to-
value levels and revaluate mortgages. 
      Nevertheless, during the last decade, The NBR undertook countercyclical macroprudential measures to 
prevent major imbalances and preventing systemic risks. (NBR Financial Stability Reports  2011, 2013) 
The main measures are summarised in Table 1.  
Table 1 The monetary and macroprudential policy tools of the Natioanl Bank of Romania 
 
  The objective               Macroprudential monetary policy tools 
Prior to the crisis 
ceiling of excessive foreign exchange 
denominated  lending  
2004 - 2007  - the reserve requirements were gradually 
increased for bank foreign currency liabilities exceeding 2 
years from 25% to  40 %; 
2006 -  the reserve requirements for liabilities denominated 
in national currency were increased from 16 %  to 20%; 
2004 – 2007 -  loan –to-value (LTV) ceiling to maxim 
75%; 
2004 - 2005 - debt-to-income (DTI) ceiling 30% 
consumption credits, 35% for mortgage credits; 
2005 -2007 - debt-to-income (DTI) 40% for total 
indebtedness, 35% for mortgage loans also extended in 
2007 for nonbanking financial institutions;  
2005 - 2006 - ceiling of bank exposure for foreign 
exchange loans granted to unhedged borrowers to 300% of 
the banks own funds; 
 ceiling of  liquidity risk 2001- a minimum level of liquidity ratio imposed at 
aggregate level and for each category to narrow the gap 
between assets and liabilities maturity;  
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ceiling of foreign exchange risk 2001 – ceiling of net foreign exchange open positions:  
10% of the bank’s own funds for maximum individual 
adjusted foreign exchange position and 20 % for the total 
foreign exchange position). 
During the crisis 
ceiling of excessive foreign exchange 
loans  
 
 
2008 - strict provisions for foreign exchange loans granted 
to individuals; 
2007 - loan-to-value (LTV) norms established by the 
commercial banks and approved by the NBR; 
2008 - debt - to-income (DTI) norms established by the 
commercial banks considering the interest and foreign 
exchange risks;  
2008 - banks are enforced to increase their capital, mainly 
those with high exposure to foreign exchange risk; 
2009 – lowering the minimum reserve ratio on foreign 
currency denominated liabilities with residual maturities 
longer than two years to zero ; 
2012 – more restricted lending norms for debtors exposed 
to foreign exchange risk; 
narrowing the excessive gap between 
maturity 
2009 - banks enforced to develop strategies for liquidity 
risk management, including alternatives for funding.   
 
Prior to the crisis, the restrictive monetary policy maintained the reserve requirement ratios at a high level 
while macroprudential policy introduced limitations (DTI, LTV) for the foreign exchange exposure of debtors 
and creditors as well. Both policies were designed as countercyclical to prevent the deepening of the expected 
crisis and its negative effects on the banking sector. DTI is a macroprudential tool that aims to provide a higher 
resilience to borrowers in the event of adverse financial developments and limit excessive credit growth. 
Setting thresholds (LTV) aims to increase the capacity of creditors and debtors as well, by reducing potential 
indebtedness of borrowers and by reducing the loss to creditors. 
Given the key role of the Central Bank in safeguarding financial stability, the connection between the 
monetary and macroprudential policies appears as natural. It emphasises, yet again, the effectiveness of the 
tools the NBR chose to prevent financial instability and mitigate the financial risks. Moreover, the increase of 
capital and liquidity reserves diminished concerns over the effects of a tight monetary policy on the financial 
stability. 
Nevertheless, adverse effects have occurred as a consequence of the countercyclical macroprudential tools: 
as the lending of the commercial banks was restricted, an eviction process was visible, since the banks 
channelled lending operations towards their non financial subsidiaries or, have transferred a share of their 
assets to the parent bank. Therefore, starting with 2007, the NBR has extended its prudential policies on the 
nonbanking financial institutions as well. 
The macroprudential monetary tools have been effective in slowing down lending and the improvement of 
capital and liquidity reserves. After the complete liberalization of the capital account, in September 2006, the 
effectiveness of the monetary measures has been hampered by the procyclical character of fiscal and wages 
policy. 
After joining the EU, the regulating and supervisory framework of the lending institutions was improved by 
applying the Basel II requirements. Furthermore, The NBR pursued a process of strengthening regulations and 
supervision, the banks setting up adequate capital and liquidity reserves. 
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The NBR also strengthened international cooperation with the EU supervisory authorities and the new 
European supervisory entities.  
In addition, communication with the banking system and the public was considered essential to explain the 
new regulations and the expected systemic risks. 
The solidity of the banking system during 2009 - 2011 was also backed by the Vienna Agreement (April 
2009) sealed by the NBR and nine foreign capital banks that hold 70% of bank assets. The Vienna agreement 
refers to: the total exposure on the Romanian market of the nine credit institutions, the increase of the 
capitalisation ratio to 10%, restrictions concerning dividend distributions during the crisis. (NBR, 2011) 
As a result of macroprudential monetary policy and the fulfilment of the Vienna Agreement, Romania has 
avoided a major financial and banking crisis.  
The macroprudential standards and the prudential rules implemented starting with 1 January 2014 for all the 
EU countries positively impact on the capacity to absorb losses and to limit the contagion effect of banks 
default on the real economy. The new prudential rules include: tighter requirements in terms of capital 
adequacy (both quantitatively and qualitatively; an additional item to capital requirements – the leverage ratio; 
minimum standards on liquidity risk and specific requirements aimed at mitigating the cyclicality of lending.  
An adequate capitalisation of the Romanian banking system creates de prerequisites for an appropriate 
implementation of the additional capital requirements required by the Basel III regulations (gradually 
implemented until the end of 2018).  
4. Concluding remarks 
The concept of macroprudential policy has gained visibility in time, but it has but its importance has been 
highlighted by the instability generated by the current crisis. Presently, a new framework is underway in the 
EU, the ESRB as the responsible authority for the macroprudential policy, setting a number of strategic 
priorities and operational procedures. They regard the necessary tools to implement macro-prudential policies 
to mitigate systemic risks, an efficient communication system and coordination measures of the EU and ESRB 
as well as an improved statistical data base. 
To be noticed that macroprudential policies are more effective when taken countercyclically. Timely taken, 
these measures are able to maintain the balance between stability and efficiency of the financial markets as 
prerequisites of economic growth. During the last decade, the NBR gained experience by applying a set of 
measures that have helped stabilise the economy and prevent major systemic risks. Thus, during 2003-2008, 
marked by an intense growth, a set of measures were taken to prevent the excessive increase of foreign 
exchange denominated loans and indebtedness of households.  
The main objective of the paper is to show that the NBR has a considerable expertise in using 
macroprudential tools in relation to borrowers, particularly regarding instruments such as the loan-to-value 
ratio (LTV) and debt-to-income (DTI) ratio. The macroprudential instruments proved relatively effective, 
especially over the longer term enhancing the resilience of debtors and creditors as well. Consequently, 
Romania has avoided a major banking crisis, unlike other European advanced countries. 
The development of macroprudential instruments is a big challenge, in the context of the implementation of 
the new macroprudential standards and the prudential rules (Basel III) for all the EU countries. In that respect, 
the experience of the National Bank of Romania can prove exceptionally useful in analysing the effects and 
calibration of instruments as well as their interaction with other policies. 
The recent financial crisis requires a reconsideration of the institutional financial system supervision. 
Therefore, the “Banking Union” is the EU -wide project, that will induce these changes into the banking system 
at European level.  
The authors will continue the research by analysing the implications of the EU-wide macroprudential policy 
project and how it will contribute to the development a stronger and more resilient Romanian banking system. 
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